Polarisation, accountability, and interstate conflict by Gallop, Max & Greene, Zachary
 1 
“Polarization, Accountability, and Interstate Conflict” 
Max Gallop and Zachary Greene 
University of Strathclyde 
 
 
Voters constrain democratic leaders' foreign policy decisions. Yet, studies show that 
elite polarization restricts the choices available to voters, limiting their ability to punish 
or reward incumbent governments. Building on a comparative elections and 
accountability perspective, we hypothesize that the governing context moderates the 
effectiveness of domestic punishment and reward. The rise of elite polarization in many 
democracies undermines voters' ability to sanction leaders through elections. Linking 
data on international crises to domestic polarization, we find that leaders are more 
likely to be involved in the initiation of inter-state disputes, resulting disputes will be 
more likely to result in prolonged conflict, and ultimately that foreign policy outcomes 
exhibit greater variance. Results from our analysis and extensive robustness checks 
demonstrate evidence that increased dispersion of preferences among key actors can 
lead to extreme and negative foreign policy outcomes as electoral mechanisms fail to 
reign in and hold governing parties to account. 
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Scholars assume that voters constrain elected leaders’ foreign policy whims. 
They argue that democratic leaders avoid conflict for fear of electoral punishment. Yet, 
comparative research finds that increased elite polarization in many democratic 
countries complicates the accountability mechanism. Polarization reduces the viability 
of alternate electoral choices to voters and therefore voters’ ability to punish 
ideologically close parties. Voters become loath to vote for parties other than the most 
spatially proximate on the left-right dimension, decreasing foreign policy’s salience. 
While researchers reveal substantial insight into the relationship between domestic 
politics and foreign policy, voters regularly fail to hold governments accountable for 
unpopular foreign policies such as engaging in international conflict. Under some 
circumstances, domestic groups decline to punish reckless elites. Consequently, context 
structures the conditions most likely to lead to elite punishment for inciting 
international conflict. 
We begin to unpack electoral accountability’s role in constraining foreign policy 
outcomes and conflict by accounting for the ways politicians and citizens prioritize 
policy. Comparative research highlights contexts in which domestic constituencies offer 
limited attention and responses on issues. Studies find that voters rarely punish 
executives directly for policy on many issues. Indeed, relative elite polarization, the 
difference in prominent political actors’ preferences on the most important dimension 
of conflict, matters for the salience of positions on other issues. Increased elite 
polarization places greater importance on parties’ positions over the left-right 
dimension and less prominence to government performance. Polarization ultimately 
determines other issues’ such as foreign policy’s and international conflict’s importance 
(Green and Hobolt, 2008; Brandenburg and Johns, 2014). Consequently, voters weigh 
relative distances to parties on the left-right dimension more heavily when parties 
polarize on that dimension (Vegetti, 2014). 
Following these insights, we argue elite polarization leads governments to riskier 
foreign policy choices as it limits voters’ ability to sanction executives. Voters focused 
on ideological costs on the primary left-right dimension of conflict pay less attention to 
lower salience issues such as international militarized disputes. This context enables 
governments preferring risky foreign policies to engage in conflicts with little concern 
for future electoral punishment. Consequently, we predict that unconstrained leaders 
will be more likely to both initiate military disputes, and escalate to full-scale war. 
Based on a measure of elite polarization derived from the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (CMP), we predict Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) initiation 
and escalation (Palmer et al., 2015). Domestic elite polarization seems to disrupt the 
accountability mechanism over foreign policy. Results indicate that elites act as if they 
are free from punishment. The findings are robust to the inclusion of citizen measures 
of polarization.1 Hawkish executives become freer to threaten and initiate conflicts 
                                                 
1We find no consistent effect of voter polarization (see the Appendix). Elite and mass polarization relate, 
but exhibit differing processes. Literature suggests that elite polarization can lead to voter polarization. 
 3 
when they believe that voters are unlikely to punish them.  
These results hold broad consequences for theories of international conflict and 
electoral accountability. Citizens hold differential capabilities to challenge executive 
behavior. Electoral responsiveness links comparative theories of voting behavior and 
policy accountability to international relations theory. It illustrates a distinct linkage 
between polarization and government behavior that undermines policy accountability 
(Carey, 2008). Studies have shown that polarization leads to poorer democratic 
outcomes, but scholars have yet to develop fully foreign policy implications. Our results 
imply that the vote-to-foreign-policy-linkage diminishes under elite polarization with 
possibly deadly consequences. 
 
Domestic Politics and Conflict 
 
Extensive research examines democracy’s effect on conflict behavior (Oneal and Russett 
1999; Gelpi 2001; Ward et al. 2007; Koga 2011; Siverson and Johnson 2016; Wolford and 
Ritter, 2016). Domestic groups’ ability to hold leaders accountable for past foreign 
policy statements plays a central role. Groups within democratic regimes constrain 
governments more than within autocracies. Much like theories of audience costs 
propose, domestic constraints encourage democratically elected leaders (with larger 
winning coalitions) to provide public goods to win reelection (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 
2005). Linked to theories of international conflict, public goods provision causes leaders 
to avoid the risk of losing wars. Voters evaluate opposition and incumbents over 
disagreements on domestic goods provision. 
Researchers contend that disagreements in parties’ preferences over economic 
and social policies structure electoral competition. Core issues constituting the left-right 
dimension focus on social, economic and political inequality (Mair, 2007), although 
disagreements on many issues may be organized along this dimension. Preferences 
over international engagement or military force are not inherently associated with a 
specific left-right position, even if they often relate (Wagner et al. 2018). Empirically, 
many democracies exhibit a secondary dimension of disagreement — engagement with 
foreign policy and institutions (Bakker et al., 2015).  
Voters struggle to hold incumbents accountable when multiple dimensions 
become salient. Multidimensionality enables electorally motivated parties to selectively 
emphasize issues across dimensions to attract voters (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012). These 
findings mirror a diversionary war logic where unpopular democratic leaders engage in 
aggressive international behavior to distract from domestic issues (Tir, 2010).  
Broadly, factors empowering voters to hold governments accountable limit 
governments’ foreign policies. Democratic competition and institutions determine 
voters’ ability to evaluate policy success. Systems with more pathways for policy 
influence or veto points limit the executive’s powers, and decrease the clarity of 
                                                 
As we explore policy outcomes and not voters’ likelihood of holding governments accountable, we expect 
that elite polarization will be the primary mechanism. Conflict occurs when elites believe that voters will 
see increased costs.  
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accountability necessary to hold leaders responsible (Whitten and Palmer, 1999; Wilson 
and Hobolt 2014). Hunter and Robbins (2016) find that candidate-centered electoral 
systems are less conflict prone; they allow voters to hold leaders accountable. Oktay 
(2018a) demonstrates that governments avoid voters’ blame for foreign policies when 
institutional and coalition arrangements diffuse policy responsibility across actors. 
Likewise, Beasley and Kaarbo (2014) show that multi-party coalitions limit voters’ 
ability to hold specific parties accountable, resulting in more extreme conflict behavior. 
Governments with greater parliamentary control yield more moderate foreign policies, 
whereas coalition governments with divergent ideologies create opportunities for 
opposition party influence (Oktay 2018b). 
This literature concludes that voters’ ability to punish incumbent elected 
governments is central to explaining foreign policy. In particular, policy accountability 
requires an opposition capable of controlling government (Przeworski et al., 1999). A 
credible competitor threatens elected leaders. It also provides citizens crucial 
information about foreign policy failures (Potter and Baum, 2013). Ultimately, the 
accountability mechanism acts through a viable opposition and voters willing to 
support them, to reduce the chances of unpopular wars with other democracies 
(Goldsmith et al., 2017). 
This research finds that democratic leaders fearing electoral punishment engage 
differently in conflict behaviors when perceiving greater electoral threat. It 
complements studies on government ideology and foreign policy behavior more 
broadly. Conservative leaders conduct more aggressive foreign policy and create 
longer-lasting disputes than those emphasizing less conservative positions (Bertoli et 
al., 2017; Koch, 2009). This bears out Kertzer and Brutger’s (2016) findings that voters 
care about both consistency and content of foreign policy. Yet, a government’s priorities 
on economic or social dimensions poorly predict foreign policy goals (Greene and Licht, 
2017). Ultimately, governmental ideology does not exist in a vacuum, but in the context 
of the potential alternative. 
 
Punishment and Reward for Foreign Policies under Elite Polarization 
 
Representative democracy demands electoral competition. Voters support 
parties based on their policy goals and past governmental performance. As 
retrospective voting theories contend, voters evaluate parties on whether they 
implement policies consistent with their pledges and responsibly manage the state and 
economy (e.g. Anderson, 2007). From a policy accountability perspective (Carey, 2008), 
citizens require options to punish or reward governments for foreign policy blunders 
by voting for the opposition without facing high ideological costs on dominant issues. 
Yet polarization makes voters less capable of punishing intransigent incumbents and 
leaders act less restrained. 
Polarization substantially impacts the character of elections. Polarization refers to 
the process in which parties, elites, or voters’ preferences on the most important 
dimension of conflict become more distant, where elections are characterized by 
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increased ideological dispersion or parties engage in “centrifugal competition" (Calvo 
and Hellwig, 2011; Ezrow and Xezonakis, 2011). Research on polarization often focuses 
on the link between voter and elite preferences.2 
Comparative studies indicate that polarization has dramatic consequences for 
voter and elite behavior.3 Cross-national evidence illustrates that polarization leads 
voters to act in a more partisan manner, less willing to support alternate parties for 
individual (foreign) policy choices (Dalton, 2008; Tilley and Hobolt, 2011). Polarization 
may actually increase party system representativeness of voters’ preferences on the left-
right dimension of conflict (Brandenburg and Johns, 2014), but decrease the 
representativeness on secondary dimensions such as foreign policy. Conversely, when 
preferences converge on the primary dimension of conflict, voters place greater 
emphasis on a greater range of issues and policy reputations (Green and Hobolt, 2008). 
Substantial research considers the effect of polarization on the consequences of 
voter decision-making. For example, Druckman et al.(2013) find that polarization 
intensifies the impact of party endorsements; consequently, voters’ factual knowledge 
decreases as reliance on elite signals increases, yet individuals’ confidence in these 
opinions increase. Elite polarization leads voters to consider a narrower, more 
ideological set of parties (Lachat, 2008; Leimbruber et al., 2010), constraining potential 
alternative government parties for a voter to support in response to reckless foreign 
policies.  
Elite polarization affects voters’ perceived benefits and costs associated with 
alternative governments. When all parties become more distinct on the left-right 
dimension, voters’ ability to punish a government (otherwise agreeable on economic 
and social policies) for foreign policy decreases. Alternate options become less 
palatable. Elites, perceiving positions as safe from electoral threat, act accordingly. The 
electoral constraint discouraging conflict weakens. Following this logic, elite 
polarization holds profound implications for representative democracy and foreign 
policy choices. 
Regardless of citizens’ ideological differences, elite polarization limits voters’ 
ability to use elections to punish and reward governments for engaging in international 
conflicts. Punishing an intransigent government comes with increasing ideological 
costs, making elections as a mechanism for accountability unrealistic. We predict that 
governing parties should act as if they are less constrained in the presence of greater 
polarization. Given the importance of domestic accountability in constraining 
conflictual behavior, we argue that polarization increases conflict. 
 
When Leaders Feel Unconstrained 
                                                 
2 For information on polarization’s causes, see Lindqvist and Östling (2010); Oosterwaal and Torenvlied 
(2010); Calvo and Hellwig (2011); Curini and Hino (2012); Adams et al. (2012). 
3 Scholars argue that polarization undermines the representative process more broadly. They find that 
polarization undermines basic requirements for electoral democracy (Linz, 1978), leads to decreased 
citizen trust in governments (Fiorina et al., 2006) and increases perceptions of corruption (Brown et al., 
2011).  
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We expect that in contexts of high elite polarization, voters’ ability to punish elite 
intransigence attenuates, causing leaders to act less constrained. Voters are unlikely to 
switch support from the government to an opposition party based on policies related to 
a secondary dimension of conflict when doing so comes with great costs on the primary 
dimension. Polarization decreases the likelihood of punishment for poor governmental 
performance (Green and Hobolt, 2008). Therefore, governments will act as if they are 
less constrained by the risk of electoral punishment. Voters’ inability to punish 
intransigence creates the context in which government leaders perceive a breakdown in 
accountability. Regardless of voters’ behavior, elite polarization creates the context in 
which the governmental leaders perceive that appealing to voters beyond their base 
offers little benefit. Feeling unconstrained by future electoral punishment, elites can 
focus attention on potentially risky foreign policy goals. 
Studies of voting behavior show that voters and parties hold complex, 
multidimensional preferences across dimensions more complicated than traditional, 
single-dimensional models suggest (Schofield and Sened, 2006). Parties campaign on 
secondary dimensions to attract supporters (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012). Some scholars 
show that experts perceive parties’ left-right positions as predictive of governmental 
positions over military deployments (Wagner et al., 2018). Others find that priorities on 
their left-right dimension from campaign materials such as manifestos only weakly 
correlate with positions on issues such as foreign policy on alternate dimensions 
(Albright, 2010; Greene, 2016; Bakker et al 2015); this multi-dimensionality influences 
foreign policy outcomes (Greene and Licht, 2017). 
Yet, parties’ preferences on the left-right dimension likely determine the 
importance of positions on issues such as foreign policy with voters. Scholars find that, 
like government competence (van der Brug, 2004; Vegetti, 2014), secondary dimensions 
become prominent when the largest parties’ positions converge towards a median left-
right position (Green and Hobolt, 2008). Conversely, as polarization on this dimension 
increases voters prioritize that dimension and downplay others.  
This discussion implies that if party polarization is low, the cost of foreign policy 
failure increases; voters face little cost on the primary dimension for supporting 
opposition parties. The increased salience of secondary dimensions leads voters to place 
greater weight on the secondary, foreign policy dimension. In this context, parties will 
be ideologically closer and foreign policy failures of sufficient magnitude shift voter 
choices. In the UK, for example, a voter might have perceived the difference between 
Tony Blair’s New Labour and David Cameron’s Conservatives as sufficiently small that 
some Labour voters could abandon Blair in response to the Iraq war (Green and Hobolt, 
2008). 
We argue that high polarization attenuates the linkage between government 
parties and voter preferences over foreign policy. Under heightened polarization, voters 
are unlikely to change support over foreign policy issues; policy sacrifices would be too 
great on the most important dimension of conflict. Consider Republican voters’ support 
for Donald Trump in 2016. Many voted for Trump despite heterodox foreign policy and 
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apparent Russian ties. They could not stomach supporting Hillary Clinton. This 
perspective does not require us to assume that voters will engage in motivated 
reasoning or adopt misinformation, although predictions from psychological 
perspectives lead to complementary predictions (Bisgaard, 2015; Kertzer and Brutger, 
2016). Instead, voters see policy goals of alternative parties as too distant. This leads us 
to expect that the costs of foreign policy failures inversely correlate with polarization. 
This perspective matches studies showing that increased elite polarization brings 
parties closer to voters’ preferences on the left-right dimension (Brandenburg and 
Johns, 2014) and that voters may switch from proximity voting to a more directional, 
centripetal approach (Leimgruber et al., 2010). 
Under this context, voters will be unlikely to switch support to an ideologically 
distant opposition for any reason. Even under multi-party governments, the regularity 
of ideologically connected coalitions leaves few options to punish sitting governments. 
Polarization, therefore, creates a context in which holding government electorally 
accountable for their performance on any issue, particularly on a secondary dimension, 
unlikely. 
When leaders expect electoral costs for foreign policy failures, this provides a 
dampening constraint on behavior which should limit the initiation of conflict. Scholars 
find that the electoral accountability mechanism leads democracies to be more selective 
and effective once they engage in conflicts (Reiter and Stam, 2003). A governing leader 
in a context with a high likelihood of punishment will use greater restraint in any 
conflict. However, it is not the actual punishment that constrains elites, but perceived 
voter retribution. Leaders assess voters’ ability to switch votes to a competitor by 
observing the opposition’s distance. Polarized parties perceive diminished electoral 
threat. Likewise, elites will see little reason to compromise on any issue when they 
expect that here is little likelihood voters will change their votes. Indeed, Spoon and 
Klüver (2015) show that polarization increases the likelihood that parties focus attention 
to issues for non-electoral reasons. Ultimately, leaders that hold latent preferences for 
international conflict will feel less constrained (Beasley and Kaarbo, 2014). On 
aggregate, this discussion implies that polarization’s attenuation of electoral 
accountability on the primary dimension of conflict will make a state more likely to 
initiate a dispute. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Democracies with higher levels of domestic polarization will be more likely 
to initiate a dispute than democracies with low levels of domestic polarization. 
 
A similar dynamic characterizes the risk that a dispute escalates to war. The 
choice to engage follows deliberate domestic debates over engaging in conflict. States 
with the potential for electoral punishment are less likely to resort to high levels of 
escalation, or be the target of higher levels of escalation (Huth and Allee, 2002). Leaders 
will perceive less personal risk from escalating conflicts; leaders that succeed attain 
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policy objectives whereas those that fail are unlikely to lose power.4 
 
Hypothesis 2: If a democracy is involved in a dispute, more polarized democracies will 
face a higher risk of escalation to war. 
 
More broadly, increased ideological polarization holds implications for the 
volatility of states’ conflict behavior. We expect that voters constrain leaders of highly 
polarized democracies less, regardless of realized foreign policy outcomes. When 
polarization is low, leaders will face strong pressure to conform to institutional and 
structural constraints on behavior and choose policies that appeal to key electoral 
constituencies. High levels of polarization allow a leader’s preferences and ideology to 
set foreign policies. Essentially, we argue that polarization reduces the constraints on 
governments, but does not necessarily increase a leader’s demand for conflict.  
From this perspective, low polarization has a dampening effect, reducing the 
range of potential outcomes. High polarization reduces potential costs that leaders face, 
but polarization alone does not incentivize leaders to engage in international conflict. 
Preferences for distinct conflictual foreign policies motivate leaders to initiate conflicts 
under high levels of polarization, whereas those with dovish policy goals do not face 
increased incentives.5 While increased polarization reduces constraints on initiation and 
escalation of conflicts, decreased accountability also increases the chance that leaders 
ignore foreign conflicts. Leaders’ exact foreign policy priorities may mean that they 
have little interest or face few other contextual incentives to initiate conflicts.6 
 
Hypothesis 3: Democracies with higher levels of party polarization will have higher 
variance in their foreign policy outcomes. 
 
In summary, we connect literature on ideological polarization and democratic 
conflict initiation to predict that polarization reduces the electoral accountability 
mechanism. This has implications for the potential that voters punish or reward 
incumbents for foreign policy failures and successes. We hypothesize that leaders freed 
from domestic voter constraints will increase the likelihood of initiating disputes (H1), 
allow disputes to escalate to wars (H2), and increase the variance of outcomes (H3) 
                                                 
4 An alternative explanation concerns elite support and audience costs. In a polarized context, leaders 
likely face greater opposition criticism for foreign policy choices, which makes the cost they pay for 
backing down particularly acute. This cost makes leaders more likely to escalate and less likely to back 
down in a crisis. This will have similar observable implications for escalation as our proposed mechanism 
centered around punishment, but strikingly different implications for initiation. If polarization leads to 
higher audience costs, leaders will also be less likely to initiate low-level conflicts where they would later 
back down, and so we should expect a null or negative effect on conflict initiation. 
5 Leaders such as former British Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, hold distinct preferences over 
economic policy, but little desire to engage in international conflict. 
6 The extremely low base rate of conflict means that in aggregate the effect of polarization is towards 
more conflict, since polarization makes over- and under-provision of conflict more likely. 
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compared to less polarized governments.  
 
Data 
 We test hypotheses by connecting data on dispute initiation and escalation to the 
dispersion of elite preferences. We focus our analysis on the available polarization data 
over the period 1960 to 2010. We limit cases to those where at least one member of a 
dyad is included in the polarization data. In our primary analysis, we focus on fully 
consolidated democracies (those with Polity scores greater than or equal to 6).7 This 
produces a list of 46 countries, which form dyads with any country. 
We investigate the effects of domestic polarization on interstate conflict by 
studying two related phenomena: 1) when states initiate military disputes; and 2) when 
disputes escalate to war. Our unit of analysis is the directed dyad-year. Our first 
dependent variable measures whether a democratic state initiates a Militarized 
Interstate Dispute8 in a year (Jones et al., 1996).9 We code the dependent variable as 
taking on a value of 1 in years where the first state is on side A of a dispute and the 
second state is on side B, and 0 otherwise. We also examine the escalation of these 
disputes to war. Following Rasler and Thompson (2006) we take our unit of analysis as 
dyads where both members were on opposite sides of a Militarized Interstate Dispute, 
where our dependent variable indicates whether the dispute escalated to war that year, 
or within five years. As our primary interest is in the countries initiating conflict, we 
remove all countries joining a pre-existing conflict from the analysis, although the 
inclusion of these cases does not impact the primary results.  
We use elite polarization as the primary independent variable as our theoretical 
approach prioritizes the decision-makers engaging in conflict: government leaders. The 
theoretical mechanism focuses on contexts in which elites believe that they will be 
unpunished. We measure party polarization as it closely represents the theoretical 
mechanism in the main analyses. We also present results incorporating citizen 
polarization (in the Appendix) that lead to substantively similar implications, but 
demonstrate that elite polarization is the primary driving factor.10 
We construct a measure of elite polarization from the CMP (Volkens et al., 2019). 
The CMP offers the most widely available measure of parties’ ideological placements 
                                                 
7 For the list and timeframe, see Appendix table 15. Analyses including less consolidated democracies 
lead to results consistent with those presented among the broader sample. 
8 We estimate models including all years where the countries are involved in such a dispute, and a model 
including only the first year of a dispute. In a separate model, in Appendix table 7 we look at all disputes 
no matter the initiator, and find that polarization effects both initiation and being the target, though the 
effect for initiation is stronger. 
9 To check robustness, we also evaluate models predicting an ICB Crisis, the results are consistent in this 
model, as depicted in table 6. 
10 Integrating survey data substantially reduces the sample of countries as citizen level preferences are 
not systematically available for the same countries and years. 
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cross-nationally and over-time.11 The CMP content analyzes parties’ election manifestos 
following a salience-based approach. It creates directional measures by coding positive 
and negative statements separately for issues. Although this data has limitations, it 
allows us to create cross-nationally comparable indicators of polarization on the 
primary left-right dimension of conflict for a substantial time-period.12 This data marks 
the most direct measures of elite polarization across countries and over-time, 
representing most cases for which theories of democratic accountability should apply. 
The use of party polarization directly links to the underlying mechanism; parties select 
government leaders. These actors will be those most likely to consider citizens’ ability to 
hold them accountable. 
We measure polarization using left-right CMP estimates for each party (the RILE 
scale) to create country-level indicators that vary over time. The CMP derives positions 
on multiple ideological dimensions from content analysis of election manifestos by 
finding the difference in the percentage left- and right-leaning sentences. Like Lupu 
(2015), we measure polarization by measuring the variance of parties’ positions for each 
country during an election year (estimates are only available in election years), 
weighted by the party’s resulting seat share following the election (Lupu weights by 
vote share). For greater explanation of our measurement approach, see the Appendix. 
The primary independent variable varies both within and between countries: within 
country variance equals 27.67. Each country’s average level of polarization across the 
time-period has a variance of 13.54. As we require polarization data to evaluate our 
hypotheses, we exclude cases where CMP data are not available. 
We also include commonly used control variables in the analysis. These control 
variables make our results comparable to common benchmark models explaining 
dispute initiation and escalation. To simplify the presentation, we present results using 
the same control variables across models, however analyses using different controls 
between models of incidence and escalation to match prominent research on each 
phenomenon lead to substantively similar results.  
For both the initiation and escalation model, we include the higher and lower 
polity score in a dyad (Marshall et al., 2009). Higher polity scores capture democracies’ 
tendencies to be involved in more disputes, and lower polity scores capture dynamics 
of the dyadic democratic peace. To account for material capabilities, we include the 
ratio of CINC (4.0) scores (Singer et al. 1972). Following Carter and Signorino (2010), we 
control for temporal independence in dispute initiation using peace-year polynomials. 
We also include indicator variables for alliances, following Gibler and Sarkees (2004)'s 
coding, and whether they are noncontiguous (using data from Weidmann et al 2010) 
coded 1 if the minimum distance between states is greater than 150 miles). Finally, we 
include the average yearly GDP growth for the pair of states (from the World Bank), 
                                                 
11 Other measures (parliamentary votes, expert surveys) include fewer countries or time-periods. 
12 CMP data limits the sample mostly to advanced democracies, excluding some new democracies and 
non-democracies, and limits the temporal range of the analysis. 
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and the ratio of material capabilities.13 
We also include additional domestic political control variables. We account for 
the distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems. Presidents often have 
more latitude to conduct aggressive foreign policy. Second, we look at whether the 
country has a majoritarian political system. Finally we include a measure of the left-
right position of the largest party in the legislature (based on CMP's RILE score). We 
present summary statistics in the Appendix (Tables 4, 5). 
 
Results 
 
We hypothesize that polarization impacts dispute incidence, escalation, and the 
variance of foreign policy outcomes. We present results from these analyses in sections 
for each hypothesis. We find evidence consistent with our argument; higher levels of 
elite polarization associate with increased likelihood of dispute incidence, conflict 
escalation and variance in each outcome. We present the results of our primary analyses 
in Table 1, 2, and 3. 
 
Conflict Initiation 
 
  We predict that elite polarization increases the likelihood of a state initiating a 
dispute (H1). We test this hypothesis using a logistic regression with directed country-
year dyad as the unit of analysis.14 Estimates in Table 1 reveal evidence consistent with 
this perspective. The coefficients associated with elite polarization are positive and 
statistically significant. 
We present the effect of polarization on the risk of war in figure 1 with 95% 
confidence intervals. As the coefficient suggests, the figure reveals that higher levels of 
polarization lead to increased likelihood of dispute incidence. This evidence is 
consistent with a perspective in which governments in more polarized contexts feel 
freer to engage in risky conflict behavior. 
 
Table 1. Generalized Linear Model of Initiation of MIDs15 
 All Initiations Initiation Onsets 
Intercept -3.29 * -4.57 * 
 (0.8) (1.23) 
                                                 
13 We use the correlates of War’s composite index of national capabilities (CINC) scores and take the 
larger value divided by the sum. 
14 Using rare events logistic regression (King and Zeng, 2001), Appendix Table 10 leads to substantively 
similar results. We also test the effect of polarization on conflict involvement at the country level looking 
at a GLM on counts of MIDs in a given year and using a raft of domestic institutional controls in table 8. 
We find that the effect of polarization is consistent with our hypothesis. We present dyadic analyses; most 
factors that affect dispute likelihood depend on characteristics of all states in the dispute. 
15 Standard errors in parentheses.∗ indicates significance at 𝑝 < 0.05. 
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CMP Polarization 0.03 * 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Largest Party RILE 0.01 * 0.01 * 
 (0.0) (0.01) 
High Polity 0.04 -0.01 
 (0.08) (0.13) 
Low Polity 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Dyadic Growth 0.07 * 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Noncontiguous -0.99 * -1.72 * 
 (0.24) (0.36) 
Capability Ratio 0.0 0.0 
 (0.0) (0.0) 
Alliance 0.69 * 0.76* 
 (0.23) (0.33) 
Majoritarian 0.34 0.75 * 
 (0.19) (0.26) 
Presidential 0.26 -0.05 
 (0.19) (0.3) 
Peace Years -0.72 * -0.24* 
 -0.05 -0.06 
Peace Years2 0.03 * 0.01 * 
 0.0 0.0 
Peace Years3 -0.00 * 0.0 
 0.0 0.0 
N 145051 145051 
Log-Likelihood -785.03 -529.33 
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Elite polarization plays a role in real world examples of conflict escalation. For 
example, Iceland’s “Cod Wars” with the United Kingdom (1958-1976) occurred in a 
context of high polarization according to our data. During this period, Iceland provoked 
conflict over the rights of UK boats to fish off Iceland’s coast. According to standard 
models of conflict onset, these interactions were surprising. Both countries were rich 
consolidated democracies. The states are non-contiguous and Iceland was clearly 
engaging in risky behavior as the ratio of capabilities between the UK and Iceland was 
approximately 1500 to 1 (see Steinsson (2016) for discussion of the Cod Wars and 
International Relations theory). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Predicted probability of MID initiation for a dyad with contiguous allies, with 
all other variables taking on their mean or median value value. We present the 
predicted effect from middle 95 percentile of CMP polarization. The rug along bottom 
of the figure shows the observed level of polarization. 
 
 
 
Our perspective suggests that Iceland’s high polarization enabled elected leaders 
to engage in risky behaviors. Out of the nine Icelandic governments from 1949 to 1976 
seven exhibit polarization in the top quartile of our sample. Furthermore, the third (and 
final) conflict occurred during the dataset’s highest observed polarization (45.42). 
Following NATO-led negotiations in 1976, Iceland reached a strongly positive outcome 
that decreased the impetus for future conflicts. Remarkably, the level of polarization in 
Iceland following the mediated agreement dramatically decreased. Only two of the ten 
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governments following the 1978 elections showed similarly high levels of polarization. 
Conflict between these NATO allies after this period did not reoccur. 
In Table 1, the control variables also correspond roughly to our expectations. 
Power preponderance suppresses the risk of conflict; allies are more likely to get 
involved in low-level disputes, as are neighbors. Finally, the effect of regime type in 
general corresponds to recent work on the democratic peace – if the “weak link" in a 
dyad is a democracy, conflict is quite rare. 
 
 
Escalation 
 
Our second hypothesis predicts that polarization also the likelihood that disputes 
escalate to war. We present the estimated impact of polarization on the likelihood of 
war within five years and immediate escalation to war. Consistent with our second 
hypothesis, the results reveal that polarization positively correlates with both 
immediate escalation to war and the risk of escalation over a longer time-span. The 
coefficients for polarization are positive in both models, but only reach conventional 
statistical significance for the five-year measure of escalation.16 
We visualize the effect of polarization on escalation in a modal case in figure 2. 
Much like the effect of polarization on conflict onset, polarization associates with 
increased likelihood that conflicts escalate to the level of a war. Consistent with our 
second hypothesis, these results suggest a dynamic in which governments in more 
polarized countries are more likely to escalate conflicts. 
 
   
  
                                                 
16 Accounting for heteroskedasticity (Appendix table 15) causes the effect of polarization on immediate 
escalation to war to become markedly more robust. 
 15 
 
Table  2: Results of a Generalized Linear Model of Escalation to War17 
 
War within 5 
Years 
Immediate War 
Intercept -29.18 * -13.93 * 
 (8.24) (6.34) 
CMP Polarization 0.11 * 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.05) 
Largest Party RILE 0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
High Polity 1.92 * 0.34 
 (0.79) (0.56) 
Low Polity -0.43 * -0.45 
 (0.19) (0.31) 
Dyadic Growth 0.03 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
Noncontiguous 3.09 * 1.25 
 (1.05) (1.19) 
Capability Ratio 2.38 * 2.04 
 (0.93) (1.21) 
Alliance -15.44 -14.08 
 (1350.36) (1231.47) 
Majoritarian 0.82 1.39 
 (0.86) (1.04) 
Presidential 1.04 0.44 
 (0.75) (0.99) 
Peace Years -0.07 -0.18 
 (0.17) (0.22) 
                                                 
17 Standard errors in parentheses.∗ indicates significance at 𝑝 < 0.05. 
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Peace Years2 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Peace Years3 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
N 396 396 
Log-Likelihood -19.46 -0.14 
 
 
 
Figure  2: Predicted probability of escalation from an MID to war with all variables 
other than polarization at their median or mean. 
 
 
 
     
Dispute Variance and Polarization 
 
Consistent with our perspective, we find evidence that polarization increases the 
likelihood of dispute onset and escalation. The results of our second analysis indicate 
that polarization’s impact is more consistent over a longer time-period (five years). 
Indeed, polarization creates the context in which leaders may make risky decisions. 
Since leaders may not take advantage of this context immediately after an election, or 
await other incentives to engage in conflict, polarization’s effect should increase the 
variance in outputs from regimes (H3). Therefore, to examine the third hypothesis, we 
examine the absolute value of the residuals for the models discussed in table 1 and 2, 
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and then regress these residuals on the level of polarization.18 Higher levels of 
polarization associate with higher levels of absolute errors in an OLS regression. 
Our third hypothesis holds implications for modeling polarization’s effect on 
conflict onset and escalation. These models likely violate assumptions of standard linear 
models: observations are not identically-distributed. Therefore, we present robustness 
checks accounting for this violation using Huber-White heteroskedastic consistent 
standard errors (Appendix tables 14 and 15). The results are consistent with those 
presented in the main analysis. In a separate model, we also performed an analysis 
where different levels of polarization were capable of having differently distributed 
errors by dividing polarization into 11 levels and clustering standard errors on levels of 
polarization (Appendix). In each case, the coefficients for polarization remain distinct 
from 0 regardless of how we estimate the standard errors. Intriguingly, this finding 
implies that high polarization leads structural factors to become markedly worse at 
explaining conflict incidence and escalation.  
 
 
 
  
Table  3: Ordinary Least Squares regression of residuals from the models, detailed in 
table 1 and table 2, on the value of polarization19 
 Initiation 
Escalation 
within 5 years 
Immediate 
Escalation 
Intercept 0.0007 * -0.0568 * -0.0322 
 (0.0002) (0.0268) (0.0222) 
CMP Polarization 0.0001 * 0.0083 * 0.0050 * 
 (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0012) 
N 145051 396 396 
R2 0.0002 0.0816 0.0446 
Adjusted R2 0.0002 0.0793 0.0422 
Residuals Standard Deviation 0.0322 0.1864 0.1543 
 
 
 
Sensitivity Analyses and Cross-Validation 
 
                                                 
18 The results of this analysis were largely unchanged in analyses focusing on the residuals of a model 
excluding polarization. 
19 Standard errors in parentheses.∗ indicates significance at 𝑝 < 0.05. 
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We also undertake extensive robustness checks (see the Appendix). In these 
models, we use alternate specifications, estimators, and operationalizations of the 
dependent and independent variables. The results are robust to a range of alternative 
modeling choices. 
Some scholars contend that the effect of elite polarization is dependent on voter 
polarization. Although elite polarization increases the risk of voter polarization, they 
are distinct processes. As our mechanism focuses on how party leaders interpret the 
likelihood of voter punishment, elite level polarization should have a more consistent 
effect on state conflict behavior even when we account for voter polarization. Models 
incorporating voter polarization reveal mixed evidence for the effect of voter, but 
consistent evidence for elite polarization. This result adds to a substantial academic 
literature demonstrating different and independent outcomes from elite versus voter 
polarization. Given the disconnect between elite and voter polarization (Leimgruber et 
al., 2010), voter polarization should be less correlated with the outcome of elite 
decisions than a measure of party polarization. 
Another perspective predicts that ideologically right parties will be more 
aggressive than left ones (Brutger and Kertzer, 2015; Bertoli et al., 2019). To evaluate 
this, we re-estimate our initiation model including an interaction between polarization 
and the left-right position of the largest party in parliament. We present these in the 
Appendix, table 18. We find that in aggregate, right wing parties are associated with 
marked increases in conflict initiation in low or moderate polarization environments, 
but under conditions of high polarization, are no more aggressive than left wing parties. 
Critical scholars might also interpret our results as dependent on the 
operationalization of key variables. Models distinguishing between the state that 
initiates a dispute and the target of that dispute find that polarization increase the 
likelihood of both. Using data on crises from the ICB leads to comparable inferences. 
Likewise, our primary results do not depend on our exact operationalization of elite 
polarization. An unweighted measure of the distribution of party preferences from the 
CMP also support our primary results. 
Conflict initiation and rarely occurs. Rare events models account for this inflation 
of the standard errors caused by the limited variation on the dependent variable. These 
models also support our primary inferences. 
Finally, we also want to consider whether accounting for polarization actually 
helps us predict conflict. To evaluate the role of polarization in predicting conflict 
incidence and escalation, we turn to an out of sample cross-fold validation exercise. For 
each case, we find improvements in the model’s explanatory value in out of sample 
prediction when we include party polarization measures. 
The analyses suggest that varying the operationalization of key variables, the 
inclusion of diverse control variables, and alternate modeling choices lead to 
comparable conclusions. We find consistent evidence of elite polarization’s effect. 
Under high levels of elite polarization, we find that governments act as if they will not 
be held electorally accountable. 
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Conclusion 
 
We propose that elite polarization increases the likelihood of inter-state disputes 
and wars. Under polarization elites believe that they are less accountable to voters; the 
threat of electoral punishment becomes an ineffective constraint. We evaluate 
hypotheses by combining data on MIDs and party polarization from the CMP. The 
results suggest a persistent effect. Leaders are both more likely to initiate disputes and 
these disputes are more likely to lead to wars in the long-run. Residuals analysis 
indicates that polarization increases the variability of foreign policy outcomes as the 
accountability mechanism weakens. Similarly, the effect of foreign policy preferences 
for elites are conditional on the level of polarization. Foreign policies under polarized 
governments are more likely to be violent and driven by eccentricities of individual 
leaders, as opposed to structural and state level forces. Finally, models incorporating 
elite polarization consistently outperform those excluding it in out of sample 
predictions. 
Despite strong evidence for our hypotheses, confounding considerations remain. 
Although the results support our main predictions, we cannot easily distinguish 
support for our perspective from predictions emerging from theories of audience costs. 
The positive support for both initiation and escalation suggest that our perspective 
better explains the initial initiation, but we do not know if escalation to larger conflicts 
is determined by audience costs or unconstrained elites. Future analyses focused on 
unpacking the connection between the causal mechanisms will provide greater clarity 
for understanding this relationship.   
Likewise, differing levels of polarization likely impact not only the external 
electoral environment, but also parties’ decision-making processes. There is little 
research directly exploring polarization’s effect on intra-party politics, but some 
evidence indicates that ideological proximity leads ideologically close voters to become 
more likely to support parties under higher levels of polarization (Vegetti, 2014). 
However, parties often select leaders due to their centrality of the party members’ goals, 
at least in parliamentary systems (Greene and Haber, 2016). 
Furthermore, studies emphasizing the parties’ elections strategies may reduce 
the risks of elite polarization as parties treat their positions as malleable and regularly 
changing to match the median voter. Although parties’ positions are likely somewhat 
flexible, models predicting median convergence in parties’ positions rarely match 
empirical reality. The assumptions required for convergence poorly match most 
modern democracies (Grofman, 2004). Indeed, elite polarization may exacerbate voters’ 
demands for parties’ more extreme policy goals (Green and Hobolt, 2008).  
Building on an electoral accountability mechanism, we argue that voters struggle 
to sanction governments under polarized contexts. Governments consequently act as if 
they are unconstrained. Given findings on increased and asymmetric party polarization 
in the United States, and the outsized role that country plays in international politics, 
these results are especially troubling for what they imply about the behavior of the 
world’s largest military power. Polarization removes structural constraints and leaves 
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conflict behavior to the whims of the executive. 
Finally, scholars debate positive and negative implications of polarization for 
electoral competition. Yet, this evidence suggests that polarization also leads to the sort 
of increased political instability that limits democratic reforms across countries (Linz, 
1978). Voters’ inability to sanction governments for taking risks such as going to war 
question representative democracy’s ability to function under high polarization. Party 
elites can begin to act as if they are free from representative ties. These results suggest 
that anti-democratic effects of polarization may extend beyond democratizing 
countries. The persistence of democracy and peace may depend on developing 
solutions to elite polarization. 
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In this Appendix, we provide additional information on our analyses, present the 
results of a series of robustness checks and perform a cross-validation exercise. In the 
main analysis, we find strong and consistent evidence for each of our primary 
hypotheses. Yet, alternative measurement strategies and model specifications may lead 
to less supportive results. Therefore, we present evidence using alternate model choices 
varying the measure of dispute, models accounting for the rarity of the dependent 
variable, models controlling for voter polarization and majoritarian election rules, and 
finally, models that allow for heteroskedasticity at levels of polarization. These results 
are largely consistent with our theoretical perspective and suggest that elite polarization 
plays a key role in the likelihood of disputes and dispute escalation.  
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1. Measuring Polarization 
To measure a countries polarization in a given year, we use 
p_i = √∑
𝒗𝒊
𝑽
(𝒙𝒊/𝟐 − 𝒙/𝟐)𝟐 
Where v_i is the vote-share for party i, V is the total voteshare for all parties, x_i 
is the parties RILE score in a year, and x_bar is the average RILE score for the 
parliament. Between election years, we used polarization estimates from the most 
recent election. For election years, if a dispute occurred in a given year, we use the 
measure of polarization for the government that was in place at the incidence of that 
dispute, if there was no dispute, we use a weighted average of the governments in place 
during the year, weighted by their time in office that year. 
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2. Table  4: Summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis of dispute 
initiation. 
   N   # of NAs  Mean  SD  
MID 
Initiation 
303918 25300 0.001 0.04 
CMP 
Polarization 
303918 25300 16.97  6.17  
PolityH 303918 67724 9.61  0.87  
PolityL 303918 67724  1.19  7.19  
CINC Ratio 303918 61568 299.71 3959.56 
NonContigu
ous Dyads  
303918 27971 0.99  0.11 
Average 
Dyadic 
Growth  
303918 94357 3.63 2.98 
Alliance  303918 25300 0.07 0.26 
Presidential 
System  
303918 69950 0.24 0.43 
Majority 
Party  
303918 25300 0.26  0.44 
Largest 
Party RILE 
303918 25805 -4.63 18.83 
Peace Years 303918 31822 36.53 42.46 
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3. Table  5: Summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis of dispute 
escalation. 
   N   # of NAs  Mean   SD  
Immediat
e War  
1846  0.00  0.04   0.20  
War w/in 
5 years  
1846 0.00  0.10 0.30 
CMP 
Polarizati
on  
1846 769  18.47   7.07  
Largest 
Party 
RILE 
1846 1002 -0.18 20.42 
PolityH  1846 0 9.15 2.26 
PolityL  1846 0 -5.59 5.52 
CINC 
Ratio  
1846 0 0.30 0.30 
NonConti
guous 
Dyads  
1846 0 0.28 0.45 
Average 
Dyadic 
Growth  
1846 1359 5.08 7.21 
Alliance  1846 998 0.25 0.43 
Presidenti
al System  
1846 0 0.44 0.50 
Majoritari
an System 
1846 0 0.22 0.42 
Largest 
Party 
RILE 
1846 1002 -0.18 20.43 
Peace 
Years 
1846 0 .26 17.04 
 
 31 
4. Results of a Generalized Linear Model of Incidence of International Crisis 
Behavior Crises. 
 The International Crisis Behavior Project [10, 9] offers an alternate measure of 
international conflict. We thus re-estimate our model of incidence using ICB Crises 
rather than MIDs. As the results show, the results remain strong, positive and 
statistically significant at the 95% level using this alternate dependent variable. 
Consistent with our perspective. Our results are therefore robust to alternate measure of 
international conflict. 
Table  6: Results of a Generalized Linear Model of Incidence of International Crisis 
Behavior Crises. 
 
    ICB Onset   
(Intercept)   -10.14 ^* 
  (0.74)  
CMP Polarization   0.04 ^*  
  (0.01)  
Presidential System   0.09  
  (0.17)  
No Coalition Government   0.65 ^*  
  (0.18)  
High Polity   0.39 ^*  
  (0.07)  
Low Polity   -0.07 ^*  
  (0.01)  
Average Dyadic Growth   0.06 ^*  
  (0.02)  
Non-Contiguous   -1.49 ^*  
  (0.19)  
Capability Ratio   -0.00  
  (0.00)  
Alliance   2.87 ^*  
  (0.15)  
𝑁   156106  
AIC   3720.77  
BIC   4119.10  
log𝐿   -1820.39  
Standard errors in parentheses  
^* Indicates significance at 𝑝 < 0.05  
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5. Table  7: Results of a Generalized Linear Model of All International Crisis 
Behavior Crises. 
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6.  MID Incidence Model 
 Some models of disputes look not at initiation but simply at the presence of a 
dispute. We find that polarization has positive effects on both initiation and being a 
target, but a stronger effect on initiating a dispute. 
 
Table 8: Model of any MID Incidence. 
   
    Model 1   
(Intercept)   -4.69 ^* 
  (0.27)  
CMP Polarization   0.04 ^*  
  (0.01)  
Presidential System   -0.63 ^* 
  (0.13)  
No Coalition Government   0.99 ^*  
  (0.09)  
High Polity   0.09 ^*  
  (0.02)  
Low Polity   -0.07 ^* 
  (0.01)  
Average Dyadic Growth   -0.04 ^* 
  (0.01)  
Non-Contiguous   -2.61 ^* 
  (0.10)  
Capability Ratio   -0.00 ^* 
  (0.00)  
Alliance   1.53 ^*  
  (0.09)  
𝑁   156106  
AIC   9381.59  
BIC   9779.93  
log𝐿   -4650.80  
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7. Country Level Model of Polarization and Conflict 
 We also test the effect of polarization on country level dispute incidence. In 
particular, we look at both initiation and involvement in disputes, both in terms of 
counts and binary measures. Given the country level focus, we mostly include measures 
of domestic political institutions (though not polity since almost all the countries are 
democracies.  
Table  9: Models of MID Initiation and Incidence at the country-year level. The first two 
models are Negative-Binomial Count Models, the last two are simple logits. 
   
   NB Initiation     NB Incidence     Logit Initiation     Logit Incidence   
(Intercept)   -0.94 ^*   -1.38 ^*   -1.96 ^*   -1.38 ^* 
  (0.22)   (0.21)   (0.22)   (0.21)  
CMP Polarization   0.03 ^*   0.03 ^*   0.03 ^*   0.03 ^*  
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
CINC Score   16.59 ^*   84.91 ^*   33.93 ^*   84.91 ^* 
  (3.19)   (9.72)   (5.02)   (9.72)  
Majoritarian System   -0.11   0.12   0.08   0.12  
  (0.19)   (0.17)   (0.18)   (0.17)  
Majority Party in 
Legislature  
 -0.56 ^*   -0.26   -0.15   -0.26  
  (0.28)   (0.26)   (0.29)   (0.26)  
Presidential System   0.63 ^*   0.65 ^*   0.20   0.65 ^*  
  (0.18)   (0.16)   (0.18)   (0.16)  
Theta   0.22 ^*        
  (0.02)        
𝑁   1146   1146   1146   1146  
AIC   2636.01   1369.19   1244.14   1369.19  
BIC   2777.24   1490.24   1365.20   1490.24  
log𝐿   -1290.01   -660.59   -598.07   -660.59  
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
^* indicates 
significance at 𝑝 <
0.05  
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8. Rare Events Model 
 In the cases of both the initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes and the 
incidence of MID and ICB crises, the dependent variable is rare compared to the 
number of dyad years available. Therefore, we follow [34] and estimate a rare events 
logistic regression, and finding no substantive changes to the effect of polarization on 
conflict in Table 9.      
 
Table 10: Rare events logistic regression on various dependent variables. 
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9.  Model with Unweighted Polarization 
 We calculate systemic polarization weighting each party’s ideological position by seat 
share to reduce the role of small extreme parties. That being said, it could be that these 
parties, like UKIP in the UK, or the AfD in Germany have an effect on the political 
system that is disproportionate to their seat share. Thus, we rerun our analysis looking 
simply at the variation in ideology between the different parties in the system, 
unweighted by seat share. In this case, the effect of polarization is even more 
pronounced. 
Table  11: Logistic regression of MID Initiation on polarization, with and without 
weighting for seat share.   
    Model 1     Model 2   
(Intercept)   -4.23 ^*   -4.02 ^* 
  (0.28)   (0.26)  
CMP Polarization Unweighted by Seat Share   0.16 ^*    
 (0.03)    
High Polity   -0.01   -0.02  
  (0.02)   (0.02)  
Low Polity   -0.06 ^*   -0.05 ^* 
  (0.01)   (0.01)  
Average Dyadic Growth   0.01   0.00  
  (0.01)   (0.01)  
Non-Contiguous   -2.83 ^*   -2.84 ^* 
  (0.13)   (0.13)  
Capability Ratio   -0.00   -0.00  
  (0.00)   (0.00)  
Alliance   1.47 ^*   1.45 ^*  
  (0.13)   (0.12)  
CMP Polarization, Weighted by Seat Share     0.04 ^*  
   (0.01)  
𝑁   178500   179600  
AIC   5477.02   5500.75  
BIC   5799.98   5823.90  
log𝐿   -2706.51   -2718.37  
Standard errors in parentheses. ^* indicates significance at 
𝑝 < 0.05  
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10. Model with Opinion Data, Voter Polarization 
 While the focus of our essay is on elite polarization, we also consider the effects 
of voter polarization on conflict behavior, using survey data from both the 
Comprehensive Survey of Electoral Systems and the World Values Survey. We use two 
measures of polarization from the opinion data, the standard deviation of individual 
placement on a 10 point left-right scale, and the number of voters in the 4 extreme 
positions. As can be seen from table 9, the effect of voter polarization, rather than elite 
polarization, depends on the survey used. However, when we use both voter and elite 
polarization data we find that the primary effect of polarization derives from elite level 
polarization. The coefficient for elite polarization is positive and significant at 
conventional levels in each model, consistent with our hypotheses. We are therefore 
confident that the effect of polarization derives from the limited choice that polarized 
elites offer rather than voters’ distribution of preferences.   
 
Table  11: A series of models using public opinion data from the World Values Survey 
and Comprehensive Survey of Electoral Systems either along with, or in place of our 
measure of polarization. We use two measures of voter polarization from the surveys. 
One looks at the proportion of voters who classify themselves as either 1 and 2, or 9 and 
10 on a 10 point left right (Tails) scale, and the other looks at the Standard Deviation of 
those classifications (SD).  
    Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4     Model 5     Model 6     Model 7     Model 8   
(Intercept)   -6.31 ^*   -3.73 ^*   -6.81 ^*   -4.31 ^*   -6.55 ^*   -4.53 ^*   -7.17 ^*   -5.17 ^* 
  (0.72)   (0.32)   (0.75)   (0.32)   (0.73)   (0.37)   (0.76)   (0.37)  
CMP Polarization           0.02   0.04 ^*   0.03 ^*   0.04 ^*  
          (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
CSES Tails       0.01 ^*         0.01 ^*    
      (0.00)         (0.00)    
CSES SD   0.01 ^*         0.01 ^*        
  (0.00)         (0.00)        
WVS Tails         0.00         0.00 ^*  
        (0.00)         (0.00)  
WVS SD     -0.00 ^*         -0.00 ^*      
    (0.00)         (0.00)      
Alliance   1.55 ^*   1.83 ^*   1.55 ^*   1.84 ^*   1.56 ^*   1.85 ^*   1.57 ^*   1.86 ^*  
  (0.20)   (0.15)   (0.20)   (0.14)   (0.20)   (0.15)   (0.20)   (0.14)  
Cap Ratio   -0.00   -0.00 ^*   -0.00   -0.00 ^*   -0.00   -0.00 ^*   -0.00   -0.00 ^* 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Non-Contiguous 
Dyad  
 -2.15 ^*   -2.07 ^*   -2.10 ^*   -2.05 ^*   -2.14 ^*   -2.05 ^*   -2.09 ^*   -2.03 ^* 
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  (0.23)   (0.17)   (0.23)   (0.16)   (0.23)   (0.17)   (0.23)   (0.16)  
Average Dyadic 
Growth  
 0.01   -0.06 ^*   -0.01   -0.06 ^*   0.01   -0.05 ^*   -0.00   -0.05 ^* 
  (0.03)   (0.01)   (0.03)   (0.01)   (0.03)   (0.01)   (0.03)   (0.01)  
High Polity   0.21 ^*   0.03   0.25 ^*   0.06   0.20 ^*   0.03   0.24 ^*   0.05  
  (0.07)   (0.03)   (0.07)   (0.03)   (0.07)   (0.03)   (0.07)   (0.03)  
Low Polity   -0.06 ^*   -0.04 ^*   -0.06 ^*   -0.04 ^*   -0.06 ^*   -0.04 ^*   -0.06 ^*   -0.04 ^* 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
𝑁   40837   75804   40837   78389   40837   75804   40837   78389  
AIC   2078.67   3245.34   2071.76   3490.12   2077.47   3231.77   2068.24   3472.68  
BIC   2354.42   3540.89   2347.52   3786.74   2387.70   3564.27   2378.46   3806.38  
log𝐿   -1007.33   -1590.67   -1003.88   -1713.06   -1002.74   -1579.89   -998.12   -1700.34  
Standard errors in parentheses. ^* indicates significance at 𝑝 < 0.05. 
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11. Controlling for Electoral System and Domestic Governments 
 The relationship between polarization and conflict might be related to the 
electoral system, either because polarization covaries with the type of electoral system, 
or because the system conditions the effect of polarization on accountability. Thus, we 
include a measure of the electoral system of the first state in a dispute – whether it is 
majoritarian or proportional based on the World Bank Indicators – and reestimate the 
model of dispute initiation. We find that majoritarian systems are more conflict prone, 
but accounting for this pattern does not obviate the need to look at political 
polarization, the same is true for presidential systems, systems with a majority party, 
systems with larger effective numbers of political parties, and countries where the 
largest party has a more internationalist foreign policy philosophy (as measured by the 
CMP). The coefficient is positive and significant in both models including the dummy 
variable to account for majoritarian electoral rules. 
 
 
Table  12: GLM of dispute incidence on polarization controlling for characteristics of 
domestic governments 
    Model 1     Model 2     Model 3    Model 4    Model 5     Model 6   
(Intercept)   -4.02 ^*   -5.82 ^*   -6.87 ^*   -5.95 ^*   -5.96 ^*   -7.22 ^* 
  (0.26)   (0.38)   (0.44)   (0.39)   (0.39)   (0.45)  
CMP Polarization   0.04 ^*   0.05 ^*   0.05 ^*   0.05 ^*   0.05 ^*   0.04 ^*  
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
High Polity   -0.02   0.08 ^*   0.13 ^*   0.12 ^*   0.10 ^*   0.15 ^*  
  (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.04)  
Low Polity   -0.05 ^*   -0.05 ^*   -0.05 ^*   -0.05 ^*   -0.05 ^*   -0.05 ^* 
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
Average Dyadic 
Growth  
 0.00   0.01   0.02   0.00   0.00   0.02  
  (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
Non-Contiguous   -2.84 ^*   -2.76 ^*   -2.68 ^*   -2.70 ^*   -2.71 ^*   -2.73 ^* 
  (0.13)   (0.14)   (0.14)   (0.14)   (0.14)   (0.14)  
Capability Ratio   -0.00   -0.00 ^*   -0.00 ^*   -0.00 ^*   -0.00 ^*   -0.00 ^* 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Alliance   1.45 ^*   1.30 ^*   1.40 ^*   1.38 ^*   1.37 ^*   1.30 ^*  
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  (0.12)   (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.13)  
Majoritarian System     0.50 ^*         0.79 ^*  
    (0.12)         (0.14)  
Majority Party     1.42 ^*   1.36 ^*   1.32 ^*   1.37 ^*   1.53 ^*  
    (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.13)   (0.13)  
Presidential System     -1.10 ^*   -0.65 ^*   -0.87 ^*   -0.36   -0.53 ^* 
    (0.21)   (0.22)   (0.21)   (0.51)   (0.23)  
Effective Number of 
Political Parties  
     0.15 ^*       0.21 ^*  
      (0.03)       (0.03)  
Largest Party 
Internationalism  
       -0.07 ^*     -0.07 ^* 
        (0.02)     (0.02)  
Majority 
Party*Presidential 
System  
         -0.74    
          (0.56)    
𝑁   179600   156106   156106   156106   156106   156106  
AIC   5500.75   4763.64   4757.40   4768.70   4777.43   4719.76  
BIC   5823.90   5201.81   5195.56   5206.86   5215.60   5237.59  
log𝐿   -2718.37   -2337.82   -2334.70   -2340.35   -2344.72   -2307.88  
Standard 
errors in 
parentheses. ^* 
indicates 
significance at 𝑝 <
0.05 
 
 
 
    
  
 41 
12. Accounting for Heteroskedasticity 
 As predicted by Hypothesis 3, there is consistent correlation between the variance 
of conflict and the level of polarization. We rerun the models to account for this 
heteroskedasticity in two ways, first by using Huber-White Heteroskedastic Consistent 
Standard Errors, and second by grouping our observations based on the level of 
polarization and clustering the standard errors accordingly. In each case, accounting for 
heteroskedasticity induced by polarization only strengthens the observed relationship 
between polarization and violence, as our broad perspective would expect.   
 
Table  13: Incidence accounting for the residual pattern discussed in section 3. The first 
model used Huber-White Heteroskedastic Consistent Standard Errors. The second 
instead divided polarization into 11 levels, and cluster the standard errors within those 
levels to account for the propensity of more 
polarized countries to have larger errors.  
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13. Table  14: Escalation models accounting for the residual pattern discussed in section 
3. The first two models used Huber-White Heteroskedastic Consistent Standard Errors 
for war within 5 years and immediate escalation respectively. The last two instead 
divide polarization into 11 levels, and cluster the standard errors within those levels to 
account for the propensity of more polarized countries to have larger errors. 
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14. Countries with Polarization Data 
  These are the countries we have polarization on for the following years.   
Table 15: Polarization data by country, for consolidated democracies (polity > 6). 
   ccode   name   firstyear   lastyear  
  900  Australia   1960  2010 
  305  Austria   1960  2010 
  211.00   Belgium   1960  2010 
  20.00   Canada   1960  2010 
  390.00   Denmark   1960  2010 
  375.00   Finland   1960  2010 
  220.00   France   1960  2010 
  395.00   Iceland   1960  2010 
  666.00   Israel   1960  2010 
  325.00   Italy   1960  2010 
  740.00   Japan   1960  2010 
  212.00   
Luxembour
g  
 1960  2010 
  210.00   Netherlands   1960  2010 
  920.00   New 
Zealand  
 1960  2010 
  385.00   Norway   1960  2010 
  780.00   Sri Lanka   1960  2008 
  380.00   Sweden   1960  2010 
  225.00   Switzerland   1960  2010 
  640.00   Turkey   1960  2010 
  200.00   United 
Kingdom  
 1960  2010 
  2.00   United 
States  
 1960  2010 
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  260.00   Germany   1960  2010 
  205.00   Ireland   1960  2010 
  350.00   Greece   1974  2010 
  235.00   Portugal   1975  2010 
  230.00   Spain   1977  2010 
  355.00   Bulgaria   1990  2010 
  310.00   Hungary   1990  2010 
  339.00   Albania  2002 2010 
  372.00   Georgia   1991   2013  
  343.00   Macedonia  2004 2010 
  290.00   Poland   1991  2010 
  360.00   Romania  1996 2010 
  369.00   Ukraine   1991  2010 
  344.00   Croatia  2000 2010 
  366.00   Estonia   1992  2010 
  732.00   South Korea   1992  2010 
  368.00   Lithuania   1992  2010 
  349.00   Slovenia   1992  2010 
  367.00   Latvia   1993  2010 
  317.00   Slovakia   1993  2010 
  359.00   Moldova   1994  2010 
  560.00   South 
Africa  
 1994  2010 
  352.00   Cyprus   1996  2010 
  338.00   Malta   1996  2010 
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15. Cross-Validation Exercise 
 The results from our primary analyses show support for each of our hypotheses. 
While it is heartening that polarization has the expected effect on both the likelihood, 
and the variance of conflict initiation and escalation, we also want to consider whether 
accounting for polarization actually helps us predict conflict. A skeptical reader might 
argue that the coefficients achieve statistical significance simply because dyad-year 
datasets have such a large sample size. To evaluate the role of polarization in 
substantively predicting conflict incidence and escalation, we turn to an out of sample 
cross-validation exercise (details in the Appendix). 
Our goal is to see how well models with and without polarization do at 
predicting conflict out of sample. In this exercise, we divide the dataset into 30 folds, 
and for each fold, use models (detailed in tables 1 and 2) estimated or "trained" using 
the remaining 29 folds to generate a predicted probability of either incidence or 
escalation. This gives us a dataset where each observation has a prediction from a 
model that excluded that observation. We perform this exercise both for models that 
both include and exclude polarization. With these probabilities, we then evaluate the 
models’ performance using both the area under the Receiver-Operator Characteristic 
(ROC) Curve and the Precision-Recall (PR) Curve. We present the results of this 
exercise in table 16. The ROC curve shows each model’s trade-off between the true and 
false positive rate at different thresholds for prediction, while the PR Curve privileges a 
model’s ability to accurately predict when an event occurs. 
Using both measures, the models with polarization outperform the models 
without polarization out of sample for all three dependent variables, in some cases 
substantially so. This gives us confidence, that not only does the effect of polarization 
conform to our theoretical expectations, but that including polarization allows us to 
have models which can better predict when democracies will initiate disputes, and 
when these disputes will escalate to war. 
Areas Under the Precision Recall (PR) and Receiver-Operator Characteristic 
(ROC) Curves for out of sample prediction. In each case, the data was divided into 30 
folds, and predicted values for each fold were derived from the other 29 folds. The 
polarization model is the model detailed in tables 1 and 2, the Null model includes the 
same variables, with the exception of Polarization from the Comparative Manifestos 
Project. 
 
Table 16. Cross-validation results  
   AUC PR   AUC ROC  
Polarization, Dispute 
Initiation  
0.097 0.907 
Null, Dispute 
Initiation  
0.088 0.906 
Polarization, 5 Year 
Window  
0.562 0.882 
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Null, 5 Year Window  0.558 0.876 
Polarization, 
Immediate 
Escalation  
0.141 0.804 
Null, Immediate 
Escalation  
0.140 0.797 
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16. Controlling for Party Foreign Policy Preferences 
 To evaluate the effect of party’s foreign policy preferences on conflict, we 
incorporate the CMP’s measure of internationalism. To do so, we follow [24] and take 
the difference between positive and negative comments about internationalism. We use 
this value for the largest party in the legislature in a given country. We interact this 
measure of internationalism with the level of polarization. The results are reported in 
table 17. We find that the effects of polarization are consistent when we incorporate this 
measure of party foreign policy preference, but the effect of preferences are conditional 
on polarization. Without polarization, having an internationalist orientation is 
pacifying, whereas the interaction reverses the effect of internationalist preferences 
under higher levels of internationalism. The coefficients suggest that the effect of 
international attitudes is conditional on polarization. 
 
Table  17: Logistic Regression of MID Initiation accounting for the largest party’s 
foreign policy preferences 
    Model 1   
(Intercept)   -5.61 ^* 
  (0.41)  
CMP Polarization   0.03 ^*  
  (0.01)  
CMP Internationalism Index   -0.28 ^* 
  (0.07)  
Polarization*Internationalism   0.01 ^*  
  (0.00)  
Presidential System   1.30 ^*  
  (0.12)  
Majority Government   -0.80 ^* 
  (0.21)  
High Polity   0.12 ^*  
  (0.03)  
Low Polity   -0.05 ^* 
  (0.01)  
Average Dyadic Growth   0.00  
  (0.01)  
Non-Contiguous   -2.70 ^* 
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  (0.14)  
Capability Ratio   -0.00 ^* 
  (0.00)  
Alliance   1.39 ^*  
  (0.13)  
𝑁   156106  
AIC   4762.33  
BIC   5240.33  
log𝐿   -2333.17  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
^*indicates significance at 𝑝 < 0.05 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 50 
17. Interaction of Legislative Ideology and Polarization 
One possible effect of polarization is that it conditions the effect of ideology on conflict. 
We have abundant research that both right wing leaders and right wing electorates are 
more belligerent. We evaluate this conditional effect by looking at an interaction of 
polarization and the RILE score (from CMP) of the largest party in the legislature. The 
results are reported below. We find that polarization has the strongest aggravating 
effect on conflict under moderate and left-wing governments, whereas right-wing 
governments do not increase their tendency to initiate and escalate conflict under high 
polarization. We demonstrate this using predicted effects plots in scenarios of low, 
moderate, and high polarization for the initiation of conflict. Here the leftmost figure 
has 5th percentile levels of polarization, the middle figure has median levels of 
polarization, and the rightmost figure has 95th percentile polarization. 
 
Table 18: Model with Interaction of Polarization and Left-Right Ideology. 
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18. Figure 4: Predicted Effects of Largest Party Ideology on MID Initiation at various 
levels of polarization. The left-most figure has 5th percentile polarization, the middle 
figure has median polarization, and the right-most figure has 95th percentile 
polarization 
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19. Inclusion of non-consolidated democracies: In our main analysis we limit cases to 
those where the initiation country has a polity score of at least 6. Here we include all 
countries that have a measure of polarization derived from CMP data, even if they are 
less democratic. 
 
Table 19: Logistic regression where sample includes all states with polarization data. 
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20. Separate Controls for escalation model: In the name of consistency we used the 
same set of controls for our models of escalation and initiation. We also estimated a 
model of initiation using controls from Rasler and Thompson (2010)’s study of 
escalation. The results are quite similar. 
 
Table 20: Escalation model with separate controls. Model 1 is for immediate escalation 
to war, Model 2 is for war within 5 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
